By Thembi Borras
Throughout the redwood region redwood tops occasionally dieback. A green live top will turn brown, lose its needles and all that remains is a brown stem and lateral branches. The tree may or may not grow another top from this persistent weak spot. The dead top will sometimes break out and the tree becomes a flat top. Trees with dead tops are prevented from growing taller unless a new top grows, regardless the tree will continue to grow in diameter.
There are different causes of redwood top dieback, along the coast the harsh salt laden winds can cause tops, especially those that stick up more prominently, to lose their needles and dieback. Between Eureka and Crescent City, in the vicinity of the Drury Bypass, bear damage is apparent. Bears do not appear to get to the top, but will shred the bark, where the tree bole is larger. If the damage is extensive, the entire tree including the top will die. In Humboldt Redwoods Sate Park just south of Scotia, evident on the Eel River side of Highway 101 are old-growth redwood where nearly every tall tree has a dead top. In this case, the highway changed the water drainage pattern and increased the exposure of the treetops to increased air movement. Increased water stress combined with desiccation may have caused the tops to die.
The most common cause of redwood top dieback is animal damage by tree squirrels, wood rats and the occasional porcupine, which can chew the bark to the cambium. If enough area is affected the flow of nutrients is disrupted and the portion above the damaged area will die. The species of squirrels most likely causing the damage are Douglas' Squirrel (Tamiasciurus douglasii), also called "Red Tree Squirrel" or "Chickaree" and to a lesser extent the Western Gray Squirrel (Sciurus griseus), also called the "California Gray Squirrel". Dusky-footed Woodrats (Neotoma fuscipes) also cause damage, in younger redwood trees, trees less than 20 feet in height. In a clump of a dozen trees, the woodrat may advance a handful of tops to die. A handful more may be lightly chewed and the balance may escape being munched altogether. You may be able to catch the tree squirrels in action as they are active during the day, but it will be harder to catch woodrats in action as they are nocturnal.
July 31, 2005
July 24, 2005
Landowner Incentives to Increase Forest Net Carbon Stores
By Thembi Borras
This post explores the answer to the following question: What mechanisms encourage landowners to minimize forest loss, increase forested areas and temper forest harvest?
A market for ecosystem services, such as clean air, clean water and carbon storage is inevitable. The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) is one such infrastructure. CCX members agree to reduce their overall carbon dioxide emissions by 1 percent per year. Members who reduce their emissions by more than 1% per year can sell the difference as "carbon credits" to other members who pay a price to pollute.
Businesses based in the US have little incentive to join the voluntary cap and trade market, as they are not required to reduce emissions. Consequently, domestic prices remain as low as $4/ton of carbon. In Europe however companies required to reduce emissions per the, now in effect, Kyoto protocol are trading and carbon dioxide emissions credits have increased to $32/ton of carbon. European markets do not presently include the forest sector. However, it is feasible that, in the future, landowners could join the market by selling the carbon stored in their forest as an ecosystem service to companies that don't meet the carbon emissions reduction targets.
Apart from the slow pace the federal government is taking, within a couple of years, the State of California may adopt a market-based cap and trade strategy to implement Governor Schwarzenegger's greenhouse gas reduction goals for the State, within which the forest sector may be included.
The value per ton of carbon would need to reach $20 for landowners to be economically enticed to participate in the carbon market. If the value per ton of carbon reached $100, storing carbon would directly compete with returns from development and short rotation timber harvest.
Other economic mechanisms include consumer preference for forest products from well-managed forests (e.g. Forest Stewardship Council certified), land use laws (e.g. urban growth boundaries), education, performance-based regulation, global fair trade laws and a vibrant timber industry infrastructure (loggers, truckers, mills etc.).
More difficult to convert into economic terms are aesthetics and the deep connection to the land that many landowners exhibit which also inspires a well-managed forest that supports carbon storage and associated values.
A portion of this production was gleaned from Forest Carbon in the United States: Opportunities and Options for Private Lands a publication offered by The Pacific Forest Trust, a 08-01-05 article entitled Free Market, Cleaner Air written by Marianne Lavelle, Michelle Passero of the Pacific Forest Trust and a 08-01-05 article entitled Morgan Stanley, Citadel Chase Profit in Pollution-Rights Trade by Adam Levy.
This post explores the answer to the following question: What mechanisms encourage landowners to minimize forest loss, increase forested areas and temper forest harvest?
A market for ecosystem services, such as clean air, clean water and carbon storage is inevitable. The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) is one such infrastructure. CCX members agree to reduce their overall carbon dioxide emissions by 1 percent per year. Members who reduce their emissions by more than 1% per year can sell the difference as "carbon credits" to other members who pay a price to pollute.
Businesses based in the US have little incentive to join the voluntary cap and trade market, as they are not required to reduce emissions. Consequently, domestic prices remain as low as $4/ton of carbon. In Europe however companies required to reduce emissions per the, now in effect, Kyoto protocol are trading and carbon dioxide emissions credits have increased to $32/ton of carbon. European markets do not presently include the forest sector. However, it is feasible that, in the future, landowners could join the market by selling the carbon stored in their forest as an ecosystem service to companies that don't meet the carbon emissions reduction targets.
Apart from the slow pace the federal government is taking, within a couple of years, the State of California may adopt a market-based cap and trade strategy to implement Governor Schwarzenegger's greenhouse gas reduction goals for the State, within which the forest sector may be included.
The value per ton of carbon would need to reach $20 for landowners to be economically enticed to participate in the carbon market. If the value per ton of carbon reached $100, storing carbon would directly compete with returns from development and short rotation timber harvest.
Other economic mechanisms include consumer preference for forest products from well-managed forests (e.g. Forest Stewardship Council certified), land use laws (e.g. urban growth boundaries), education, performance-based regulation, global fair trade laws and a vibrant timber industry infrastructure (loggers, truckers, mills etc.).
More difficult to convert into economic terms are aesthetics and the deep connection to the land that many landowners exhibit which also inspires a well-managed forest that supports carbon storage and associated values.
A portion of this production was gleaned from Forest Carbon in the United States: Opportunities and Options for Private Lands a publication offered by The Pacific Forest Trust, a 08-01-05 article entitled Free Market, Cleaner Air written by Marianne Lavelle, Michelle Passero of the Pacific Forest Trust and a 08-01-05 article entitled Morgan Stanley, Citadel Chase Profit in Pollution-Rights Trade by Adam Levy.
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